This paper introduces a concession equilibrium solution without weighted aggregation operators to multiattribute group decisionmaking problems (in short MGDMPs). It is of practical significance for all decision-makers to find an optimal solution to MGDMPs or to sort out all candidate solutions to MGDMPs. It is proved that under certain conditions the optimal concession equilibrium solution does exist, and on this important result the optimal concession equilibrium solution is obtained by solving a single objective optimization problem. Moreover, the optimal concession equilibrium solution is equivalent to the robust optimal solution with the group weight aggregation under the worst weight condition. Finally, it is proved that the concession equilibrium solution is equivalent to a complete order, i.e. all candidate alternatives can be sorted by concession equilibrium solution. By defining the triangular fuzzy numbers of target concession value, the optimal concession equilibrium solution or the order of the alternative solutions can be obtained in the range of objective concession ambiguity. Numerical experiment shows that the solution can balance the evaluations of multiattribute group decision makers. This paper provides a new approach to solving multiattribute group decision-making problems.
Introduction
The multiattribute group decision-making problems (MGDMP) exist in many areas such as social network, supplier selection, competitive business environment, economic analysis, strategic planning, medical diagnosis, venture capital, and etc. Because of the conflict between attributes and decision makers, it is very difficult to solve a MGDMP.
Suppose that there are decision makers, 1 , 2 , . . . , ( > 1) -a group of experts-and the multiattribute evaluation (cost or benefit) function for is : → , = 1, 2, . . . , . Let be a candidate scheme (solution) and the set of all candidate schemes be ⊂ . Each decision maker selects a solution or a ranking of the candidate schemes from by evaluating ( ). This paper studies multiattribute group decision-making problem as follows:
(MGDMP)
. . . (1) When = 1, (MGDMP) becomes a group decision-making problem (GDMP), which is a single-attribute one. So far, almost all the studies on MGDMPs focus on the weighted aggregation methods and fall within the following four main areas:
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(1) The weighted aggregation method used earlier is mainly based on given weights. For example, Choi (1998) [1] and Kim (1999) [2] et al. gave a method involving multiattribute weights and group members' weights to find out the best candidate. Wei (2000) [3] et al. gave the compromise weight method with individual preference. This idea of the aggregating OWA operator weights has been widely studied and promoted (see Xu (2009) [4] ; Yue (2012) [5] ; Zhou, Chen, and Liu (2012) [6] ; Liu, Cai, and Martnez (2013) [7] ; Liu, Zhang, and Zhang (2014) [8] ; Gao, Li, and Liu (2015) [9] ; Dong, Xiao, Zhang, and Wang (2016) [10] ).
(2) Some studies focus on weighted aggregation methods that consider the uncertainty of weights, such as weights being an interval or a probability distribution. For example, Merig, Casanovas, and Yang (2014) [11] studied the uncertain generalized probabilistic weighted averaging (UGPWA) operator. Qi, Liang, and Zhang (2015) [12] presented a method of generalized cross-entropy based group decisionmaking with unknown experts and attribute weights under interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy environment.
(3) In recent years, some new complex methods using fuzzy theory are applied to the weighted aggregation methods. For example, Sadi-Nezhad and Akhtari (2008) [13] studied a possibilistic programming approach with fuzzy multidimensional analysis preference. Yan and Ma (2015) [14] proposed an approach to uncertain quality function deployment based on fuzzy preference relation and fuzzy majority. More research literatures can be seen in Xu, Chen, Rodrguez, Herrera, and Wang (2016) [15] ; Bayrama and Sahin (2016) [16] ; Chen and Kuo (2017) [17] ; Banaeian, Mobli, Fahimnia, Nielsen, and Omida (2018) [18] .
(4) The hesitant fuzzy linguistic term set and the linguistic distribution are becoming popular tools to solve MGDMPs. For example, Thuong, Zhang, Li, and Hong (2018) [19] proposed a quantitative hesitant fuzzy judgment description with an embedded assessing attitude to evaluate financial statement quality (FSQ) to overcome the weighting difficulties, and applied a distance-based method to determine the evaluators' weights and a weighted averaging operator to compute the criteria weights of MGDMPs. [20] proposed an entropy method that is generalized to a linguistic setting to derive the important weights for the attributes with quite different values, which are considered more important and therefore have higher weights for MGDMPs. Wu and Xu (2018) [21] considered the preferences of the decision-makers using fuzzy preference relations and a novel distance measure over the possibility distribution based hesitant fuzzy elements is defined to compute the various consensus measures. More research literatures can be seen in Wu, Li, Chen, and Dong (2018) [22] ; Wu, Dai, Chiclana, Fujita, and Herrera-Viedma (2018) [23] ; Li, Rodrguez, Martnez, Dong, and Herrera (2018) [24] ; [25] ; Wu, Jin, and Xu (2018) [26] .
All the above literatures on weighted aggregation almost all focus on limited number of candidate schemes (solutions) to MGDMPs. But, the weighted aggregation method is a commonly used method in solving MGDMPs. Its fatal weakness is that different weights lead to different ranking of the candidate schemes (or candidates), and it is impossible to prove which weighted aggregation method is the best.
In literatures on MGDMPs, the attributes' weights and the experts' weights should be determined, e.g. in [5] the weights were determined by using all the schemes, then if there are infinite number of candidate schemes, the method will become ineffective. On the other hand, different attributes' weights and experts' weights will lead to different ranking of the final scheme, which would result in an outcome that makes it difficult to determine which ranking is the best. So we propose an s-concession equilibrium solution to MGDMPs to avoid the determination of attributes' weights and experts' weights, and it provides an optimum solution to the situation when there are infinite number of schemes for MGDMPs.
To solve the infinite-number-of-candidate multi-decision-maker decision-making problems, Meng, Hu and Dang (2005) [27] proposed an s-concession equilibrium solution with single attribute mathematical programming model for the coexistence of competitions and cooperation problems. Meng, Hu, Jiang and Zhou (2007) [28] gave an sconcession equilibrium solution with single attribute interactional programming model for the coexistence of competitions and co-operations problems. Xu, Meng, and Shen (2015) [29] introduced an s-concession equilibrium solution and gave a cooperation model based on CVaR measure for a twostage supply chain with a single-attribute GDMP. Jiang, Meng and Shen (2018) [30] proposed for the first time the target concession value of s-concession equilibrium solution to the single-attribute GDMPs. But, an s-concession equilibrium solution to MGDMPs with the target concession value has not yet seen in published literatures.
Jiang, Meng and Shen (2018) [30] introduced a concept as to the solution to group decision-making problems (GDMPs): -concession equilibrium solution, which is more adaptive to the situation where the number of candidates is unlimited, and used an example to show how to solve the product ordering and production operation decisionmaking problem between the retailer and the manufacturer using the -optimal concession equilibrium solution under the case where the number of alternatives is unlimited. The concept is characterized by that, for each decision maker, each objective attribute gives the corresponding concession value , and the -optimal concession equilibrium solution is the minimum concession given. The -optimal concession equilibrium solution provides a natural criterion for evaluating the merits of the candidates. Obviously, it is different from other existing methods with weighted aggregation operators, because -optimal concession equilibrium solution is a method that provides a natural criterion for evaluating the merits of the candidates and does not use weighted aggregation operators. According to the definition of * -optimal concession equilibrium solution, the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution is obviously not dependent on the evaluation function of one DM. On the other hand, for each scheme, the equilibrium value is the same for each decision maker's goal. Therefore, the -optimal concession equilibrium solution has its individual rationality.
In this paper, based on the idea of concession equilibrium to GDMPs (Jiang, 2018) [30] , the optimal concession equilibrium solution to MGDMPs without weighted aggregation operators is defined. Our innovation includes (1) a new * -optimal concession equilibrium solution is proposed, where * is a vector, while the concept --optimal concession solution defined in [30] cannot solve (MGDMP); (2) the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution is a robust solution in all the weighted aggression sets; (3) a new triangular-fuzzyconcession ranking method is proposed based on the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution, and the rankings in the numerical experiments show stability under different concession values.
s * -Optimal Concession Equilibrium Solution to MGDMP
In this section, * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to MGDMPs and its property are discussed. Let = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) ∈ ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) be given, where is called the target concession value of
Definition . Let * ∈ , ∈ , and ≥ 0 ( = 1, 2, . . . , ).
If there is
i.e.,
then * is called -concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMPs) at the value . The | | = ∑ =1 is called an equilibrium value of (MGDMP) to * . is called an equilibrium point of (MGDMP) to * . The set of all equilibrium values | | of all -concession equilibrium solutions * ∈ to (MGDMP) is denoted as . If * is the * -concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) and | * | is the minimum of the set , then * is called the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the target concession value . | * | is called the optimal equilibrium value, and obviously the optimal equilibrium value is unique.
* is called the optimal equilibrium point, and the equilibrium point * of * is not always unique.
This differs from the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to single attribute group decision-making problem (Jiang, 2018) [30] . Furthermore, to solve the infinite-numberof-candidate MGDMPs and avoid the determination of the attributes' weights and the experts' weights, the s-concession equilibrium solution and s * -concession equilibrium solution are introduced.
Obviously, we have the following property.
Property . Let * be * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value .
(1) Let ∈ . If
then | * | ≤ | |.
(2) Then * be 0-optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value ( * ), where (
If has only a finite number of solutions, then the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) exists.
Property 2 indicates that, with the given , * is the minimum concession value among all the candidates, so its corresponding * -optimal concession equilibrium is the best solution in all equilibrium values.
When the different target concession values, i.e., different , are given, different * -optimal concession equilibrium solutions are obtained, as shown in the following example.
Example . Consider the following GDMP.
If 1 = ((0, 0) , (0, 0) ), we have
( , ) = (1, 1) is the (2, 2) -optimal concession equilibrium solution to the problem at the concession value 1 . This solution gives the minimum equilibrium value of each decisionmaker's individual objective.
(0, 2) is the (0, 0) -optimal concession equilibrium solution to the problem at the concession value 2 .
From the above example, it is understood that when is given, an optimal concession equilibrium solution is obtained. And Lemma 4 gives the conclusion that under certain conditions any feasible solution to (MGDMP) is the concession equilibrium solution.
For each = 1, 2, . . . , ; = 1, 2, . . . , , we have the following single objective optimization problem: Proof. For any ∈ , we have * ≤ ( ) , = 1, 2, . . . , ; = 1, 2, . . . , .
So, we have
So,
Therefore, by Definition 1, the conclusion of the theorem is true.
Define the following optimization problem: Proof. First, assume that if ( * , * ) is an optimal solution to (S), then for any ∈ , we have
. . , ; = 1, 2, . . . , .
So, by Definition 1, we have that * is * -concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value . Let be -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value . By Property 2, we have | * | ≥ | | and
Therefore, ( , ) is a feasible solution to (S). So, | | ≥ | * |. That is | | = | * | and * is * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value . Now, assume that * is an * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value . Then by Definition 1 it is known that ( * , * ) is a feasible solution to (S). Let ( , ) be an optimal solution to (S). By the above proof, is an -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value . Therefore, | | = | * |. So, * ≡ and ( * , * ) is an optimal solution to (S). Theorem 5 points out that if is -concession equilibrium solution, then
Furthermore, Theorem 5 gives that if there exists * -optimal concession equilibrium solution, the optimal solution for ( ) must exist. Then we have the following.
Theorem 6. Assume that is a compact set and ( ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ; = 1, 2, . . . , ) is continuous on . en the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) exists.
Proof. By the assumption, there is an optimal solution to each ( ). By Lemma 4, we have ̸ = 0. We prove that is close. Assume that a sequence { } ⊂ converges to * . For = 1, 2, . . ., let * ∈ be an -concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP). Because is compact, the sequence { * } has a convergent subsequence. Without loss of generality, let * → * ∈ . By Definition 1, we have
Let → +∞, and then we have
So, * is the * -concession equilibrium solution. Therefore is close. By Lemma 4, there is a minimum * in . Given a sufficiently large > 0, define the problem: 
It is obvious that the problem (S) is equivalent to the problem (S), and the feasible set of the problem (S) is compact too. Therefore, there exists the optimal solution ( * , * ) to (S) , then ( * , * ) is also the optimal solution to the problem (S). By Theorem 5, the conclusion is true.
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To solve (S), ( ) must be solved first, which is quite difficult. Therefore, we have the following Theorem 7, where solving a single objective programming problem ( ) obtains the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP). 
where , , , = 1, 2, . . . , ; = 1, 2, . . . , , are variable of ( ). We have better results as follows. 
By (20), (21) 
Here,
We have that ( * , * ) is a feasible solution to (S). Therefore, | * | ≥ | * | and * is * -optimal concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value .
Based on Theorem 7, we have the following corollary. 
As per Corollary 8, there is ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ) which can be seen as the group weighted aggregation of (MGDMP). Next, in the Set (27) consisting of all the aggregations, the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution is a robust optimal solution, as shown in Theorem 9.
Let D 's evaluation be ( ) − − * for . By using weights 1 ≥ ≥ 0, 's evaluation becomes ( ( ) − − * ) for and = 1, 2, . . . , . With the linear weighting method, the evaluation of all decision-makers for is defined as 
The worst evaluation score of the solution solves: max ∈Λ ( , ) for each ∈ . Let ( ) = argmax { ( , ) | ∈ Λ}. Then, we are to find a minimum score from these worst scores min ∈ ( , ( )), i.e.,
6 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
We prove the following conclusion.
Theorem 9.
Supposing that the optimal solution to ( ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ; = 1, 2, . .
. , ) exists, then the problem (S) is equivalent to the problem (̃).
Proof. For a fixed , the problem max ∈Λ ( , ) is a linear programming:
The dual problem of Λ( ) is
Based on the strong duality theorem, there exists the optimal solution to the problem Λ( ) and the problem ( ), and the optimal objective values are equal at their optimal solutions. Let * be an optimal solution to Λ( ) and * an optimal solution to ( ), then | * | = ( , * ) = max ∈Λ ( , ). Therefore, the conclusion of theorem is true.
From the viewpoint of robustness, Theorem 9 means the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution is the robust solution for the decision-makers under the worst weights in Λ.
The evaluation function ( ) ( = 1, 2, . . . , ; = 1, 2, . . . , ) of all decision-makers should be consistent as far as possible.
* ( = 1, 2, . . . , ; = 1, 2, . . . , ) is the ideal goal. Obviously, the closer the solution to the ideal goal, the better. A deviation function is defined by 
That is 
Corollary 10 means that the optimal concession equilibrium solution * has a minimal upper bound (1/ )| * | + (1/ )| |. △( * ) can be used to evaluate the closeness between the * -optimal concession equilibrium solution and the ideal objective.
Example . Consider problem (MGDMP)
We know that 
By Theorem 9, the optimal solution to min ∈ max
( , ) is * = 0. As a comparison, we are to use the linear weighted method to solve this problem, a very famous method (Kim and Han (1999) ) [2] where weighted value 1 , 2 ∈ [0, 1]. When 1 > 2 , an optimal solution to min ∈ ( , ) is * = −1. When 1 < 2 , an optimal solution to min ∈ ( , ) is * = 1. But, when 1 = 2 , no optimal solution to min ∈ ( , ) exists. On other hand, the deviation function △( ) is minimum at * = 0, but maximum at * = 1 or * = −1. It means that the linear weighted method is invalid or bad in this example. Therefore, no matter how the weight is obtained, the linear weighting method may be invalid.
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Ranking and Fuzzy Target Concession Value of MGDMP
Now, we define the ranking in the set of -concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value . Deviation of equilibrium value of -concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the value is defined as Proof. According to assumption, we have
By Definition 1, we have
Theorem 13 shows that the concession equilibrium solution must be nondominated for all decision-makers.
Example . Consider a MGDMP. Three decision-makers are to rank three candidate solutions through scoring, as shown in Table 1 . Let 1 = ((0, 0) , (0, 0) , (0, 0) ) and 2 = ((0, 0) , (1, 1) , (2, 2) ).
Here, by Definition 12, when 1 = ((0, 0) , (0, 0) , (0, 0) ), we have 1 ≡ 2 ≡ 3 . But when 2 = ((0, 0) , (1, 1) , (2, 2) ), we have 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 . Example 14 shows a fact that when the decision-makers do not have the same target concession value , the ranking order of -concession equilibrium solutions is not the same. 
By Property 2 (1), we have | 1 | ≥ | 2 |. Theorem 16 means that the bigger the target concession values for all decision-makers, the smaller the equilibrium values. But, it is very difficult to take the target concession value for each decision-maker. The decision-maker can give the approximate range of the target concession value, using fuzzy number. Now, the decision-makers give fuzzy number of the target concession value which is defined as follows: 
where ( , , ) is called a triangular fuzzy target concession value of ( = 1, 2, . . . , ). 
then * is called -concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the target concession value , * is called -concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the target concession value , and * is called -concession equilibrium solution to (MGDMP) at the target concession value .
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